Foreign Policy and Dependency: The Case of Jamaica, 1972-89

This is an excerpt from “Foreign Policy and Dependency: The Case of Jamaica, 1972-89” written by Dr. Holger Henke. The paper was published in 1994 in Vol 43 of the academic journal, Social and Economic Studies, published quarterly by the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies at UWI Mona. Dr Henke’s paper is a shortened version of his book, Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's Foreign Relations, 1972-1989, published in 2000. This excerpt looks at how former Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley, went against US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and instead, supported Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. This passage is publish on this website with the permission from Dr. Henke and the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies.

There is perhaps no better example of how the Government's foreign policy was affected by both internal and external pressure than its almost accidental decision to support the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In early November 1975 the Cuban Government had decided to send regular combat troops to Angola in order to help the beleaguered liberation movement MPLA to resist the two rival movements fighting alongside the South African white supremacists' army and the CIA. Towards the end of December the Jamaican Government found itself pressed to take a position. With Manley approval the Party General Secretary D.K. Duncan had on the occasion of a visit to Cuba announced that the PNP (sic!) supported the MPL A' s cause and its right to invite assistance from any source and also welcomed Cuba's action.

A few days later the U.S. Secretary of State, who had taken the Angolan issue to his heart, arrived for a vacation in Jamaica. As Manley reports, Kissinger tried on this occasion to exert pressure. Earlier, the Government had already de facto recognised the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. According to informed sources (and contrary to Manley's account), the Jamaican Prime Minister indicated his willingness to make concessions on this issue.

Similarly, the Jamaican Chamber of Commerce and the conservative sector of the media recommended a hands-off approach to the Government. Nevertheless, elements in the Government were inclined to officially support Cuba's move. Thus, in February, Foreign Minister Thompson called Cuba's help a "salvation". Official support was issued only two weeks later in March and, as it turned out, Jamaica was one of the last countries to officially recognise the MPLA (de jure) and Cuba's help for the MPLA. Moreover, the way the recognition came about suggests that the Government was even at that late point not yet fully prepared for its issuance, but rather saw itself in a position where it could no longer avoid it.

Thus, on March 2 the Prime Minister answered to a question in Parliament, ambiguously asking him if the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was an interference in the internal affairs of that country that he would "not regard that as interference". Apparently aware that this brief answer could easily be misinterpreted, the Government found itself pressed to issue a comprehensive clarification on the next day and to finally come out with an explicit (and prepared) statement. However, even this statement sounds rather like a defensive explanation than a principled, wholehearted embrace (as the PNP chose to claim later):

“All the evidence available to us makes it clear that Cuban troops are present in Angola at the specific and open invitation of the MPLA which is recognised by the majority of African states at the legitimate Government of Angola. The evidence available to us makes it quite clear that South African troops invaded Angola on October 23, 1975, and had advanced to within striking distance of Luanda, the capital of the country. (...) The evidence available to us indicates that the Cuban troops assisted our black brothers in Angola to defeat the forces of the white racist regime of South Africa, thereby removing the threat of a disastrous extension and expansion of white supremacist power in South Africa. On the basis of these facts, the Cuban presence in Angola is neither clandestine nor subversive”

After this decision to support the Cuban presence in Angola, relations between the U.S. and Jamaica rapidly deteriorated. In mid March, the U.S. press started a barrage of anti-Jamaican articles which was opened by an article in the New York Times by James Reston, a close confidant of Kissinger. U.S. media readily echoed criticism and arguments which originated from the Jamaican bourgeoisie. Subsequently, relations with the U.S. (and, consequently, international capital) deteriorated to a point where U.S. media allegations were rejected and counter-charges (i.e. destabilisation) issued which in turn were denied by U.S. officials. The whole scenario was critically commented on by the Jamaican Opposition, bourgeoisie and conservative media. It is arguable that with the government's defiant decision to support Cuba's help, the cornerstone for the future cooperation between internal and external opposition forces was laid.