Henry Kissinger vs Jamaica: In The Words of Michael Manley (Transcript)

Taken from: “Jamaica: A Struggle In The Periphery” by Michael Manley. pg 111 to 117

Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership faced their most difficult single decision since the success of the revolution in 1959. It was by no means their first crisis but involved a decision of epic proportions. They had to consider the enormous logistical problems, since no Cuban plane could fly direct from Cuba to Angola. They had to face a military judgement of profound difficulty. 

Could they get combat troops to Angola quickly enough and in sufficient numbers to avoid a disastrous defeat for those who would arrive first? 

This would have been tremendous political implications for them at home and internationally. 

Would South Africa escalate the conflict if the Cubans engaged them in combat? How would the expenses of a protracted war be met? 

Then there was the most difficult question of all. There were signs that at long last a thaw in the relations between Cuba and the United States might be coming. They had felt the pressure of economic blockade for fifteen years. They had a high price for it. What would the US do if they moved? 

In the end, the leadership met for an entire night and took their decision as the first light of dawn appeared to the east of Havana. They decided they must respond to Neto’s cry for help. It was a decision that altered the course of history.

 Cuba transport planes took to the skies within hours. Many had their last refuelling stop in Bridgetown, Barbados, on their way across the Atlantic. Others refuelled in Guyana. They got there in time. 

When the first Cuban combats unites assembled in Luanda and began moving south, the South African Army was already 500 miles into Angola. They were not quick enough. They were engaged by Cuban forces at Benguella and Malange on November 14, 1975. Their bluff called, the leaders in Pretoria though again. They ordered the units back inside Namibia once the first defeat had established the quality of the Cuban force which they faced. The fledgeling State was saved. In due course, the MPLA, was able to stabilise the situation and Angola thus took its place as an honourable member of the heroic fraternity, the Front Line States. It is this group which has borne the brunt of the struggle for freedom in Zimbabwe, the struggle that continues in Namibia and must one day be resolved in South Africa itself. 

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this Cuban action. You have to go back to the days of Alexander the Great to find a parallel where so small a country by feat of arms has affected so profoundly the balance of forces on a continent. If South Africa had installed Savimbi as its puppet ruler, it is safe to say that Rhodesia’s Ian Smith would be firmly in control to this day. By now Zambia might have fallen, Namibia would be a lost cause, Botswana throttled, Tanzania and Mozambique impossibly isolated. Certainly Tanzania could have lifted the yoke of [Idi] Amin from the necks of the Ugandan people. The whole of Southern Africa might now be firmly in the grip of the racists operating through puppet regimes which they could manipulate while isolating the others. This may seem like an exaggeration. But the progressive group of regimes involved face enormous problems. 

Danger lurks everywhere for the regimes which stand firmly against imperialism, and for a different configuration of power in the world. They are threaten by internal sabotage and external pressure… The survival of each is affected by the solidarity of the group. The margins are as fine as the dangers are real. It is in this context that we must understand the survival of a progressive Angola in 1975. The Western economic system would have an uninterrupted vista of exploitation of those untapped resources which amount from Zaire due east and all the way south. 

None of this was lost on the multinational corporation; none of this escaped the attention of political leaders of northern industrial countries. Certainly none of the implication was missed by Henry J. Kissinger. Moreover, apart from reading the deeper, strategic implications, Kissinger was personally appalled by the whole turn of events, At home in a world dominated by US and Soviet power, a master of the game plan in which the big pieces dominate the chess board of human history, Kissinger’s sense of order was outraged at the thought of mere pawn behaving as if it is were a queen or at least a rook or knight. 

How dare a little foot soldier on the world’s military stage transport troops thousands of miles as if it were a major power! 

The normal world of power politics cannot accommodate variables of this kind. If small nations can determine the fate of the weaker brethren, what world order is possible in this view? 

It is now history that Kissinger reacted with almost ungovernable rage to what had taken place. He was already discomfited by the exposure of the hand that the CIA had played in the entire matter. Now he was to take out his anger by mobilising anybody in Latin America who would listen… My own experience with Kissinger in the matter was instructive. 

…

As all this was unfolding in Africa, during 1975, Jamaica was feeling the economic pinch. Foreign exchange was scarce. One of my economic advisers had come up with a plan to ask the US Government to make available trade credits worth $100 million in 1976 to help keep our vital industries going. These were not to be gifts but actual commercial credits to be paid for with interest over reasonable periods of time. At the very moment when this idea was been broached in Washington, the CIA was busy working for the downfall of Neto and the MPLA. 

Then, as luck would have it, Henry Kissinger was to spend a short vacation on Jamaica’s North Coast with his new bride Nancy. The visit was in response to an invitation by our Foreign Minister and took place shortly after the South Africans returned to Namibia. I had invited him to lunch during his stay and he had accepted. During lunch he sat on my right and although probably fuming at this interruption of his holiday was very much his witty and urbane self. He assured us that the CIA was not interfering in Jamaica’s affairs. The question arose because there was considerable speculation at the time that this was indeed the case. As he said it, similar assurances given concerning Chile flashed a little ominously across my mind. 

Suddenly he raised the question of Angola and said he would appreciate it if Jamaica would at least remain neutral on the subject of the Cuban army presence in Angola. I told him that I could make no promises but would pay the utmost attention to his request. I pointed out that we were at the very moment dispatching Dudley Thompson to Africa to find out at first hand how the Africans viewed the situation in Angola. I said further that the South African invasion was a terrible thing as far as we were concerned, and that we would be paying close attention to the actual sequence of events as between the entry of South African and Cuban troops. In any event, I told him that before taking any official position on it internationally, I would communicate with him in Washington. 

Afterwards Kissinger and I retired to my office for a short tete-a-tete. Again, as if from nowhere, he brought up a subject. This time it was the Jamaican proposal for the hundred mullion dollar trade credit. He said they were looking at it, and let the comment hand in the room for a moment. I had the feeling he was sending a message. 

We took the Angolan situation so seriously that I spoke to Nyerere and Kaunda on the phone personally, canvassing their views on what had actually happened. Dudley Thompson attended the OAU meeting which was called to discuss the Cuban presence and role. The OAU voted to support Cuba’s action although many of its members were bitterly opposed to Cuba’s revolutionary government and Marxist-Leninist process… We knew what Jamaica’s duty must be. 

Within five days of his leaving for home, I let Kissinger know that Jamaica had decided to support the Cuban army presence in Angola because we were satisfied that they were there because of the South African invasion. The Jamaican government then publicly announced it support for Cuba in Angola. I never heard another world about the hundred million dollar trade credit. Of course, I could never say positively that this was an example of the famous Kissinger theory of linkage. But the question has been left hanging in my mind. 

Soon after the news that Jamaica was supporting Cuba, Kissinger confidante, James Reston of the New York Times, wrote a viscous and utterly inaccurate article about Jamaica. The article marked a turning point in Jamaica’s image in the United States. Reston’s wild charges about violence in Jamaica, the alleged presence of Cuban troops and Cuban secret agents, all added up to an impression of a Cuba takeover. This started off a chain reaction in the US press which never ceased until were finally defeated in the elections of October 1980.

The lunch was in December. Before the end of January, the US Embassy staff in Kingston was increased. Seven new staffers were flown in. Yet all aid to Jamaica suddenly slowed to a virtual halt. The pipelines suddenly became clogged. Economic co-operation contracted as the embassy expanded.